In our eighteenth installment, we continue to explore the evolving landscape of Mets prospects as documented by Baseball Digest. In 1981, the publication maintained its format of providing short thumbnails on each team's top prospects. This time, four Mets players were highlighted, including Mookie Wilson for the third year in a row, we will examine the remaining three: Hubie Brooks,Mike Scott and Ed Lynch. Let's delve into the careers of these three promising players and examine whether they lived up to the expectations set forth by Baseball Digest.
Hubie Brooks: Power Realized, Defensive Promises Unfulfilled
Scouting Report:"Line Drive hitter who has potential to hit 12 to 15 HRs a year. Only 1 error in 27 games for Mets; good fielder with lots of range"
The *Baseball Digest* scouting report from March 1981 accurately described Hubie Brooks as a line-drive hitter with potential power, projecting him to hit between 12 and 15 home runs per season. In reality, Brooks met these expectations, reaching a peak of 20 home runs twice (1988 and 1990) and generally maintaining a consistent power output throughout his career. His offensive performance was further highlighted by his career .269 batting average and notable seasons, such as his .307 average in 1981 and his 100 RBIs in 1985, demonstrating his capability to be an impact player at the plate. His ability to hit for average and drive in runs was validated by two Silver Slugger Awards and two All-Star selections, showing that his offensive potential, as predicted, was realized.
Defensively, the scouting report was somewhat optimistic. Although praised for his range and solid glove early on, Brooks' fielding was not as reliable as anticipated. Despite his athletic versatility, playing third base, shortstop, and right field during his career, he struggled at times with errors, notably setting a record by committing three in one inning during his rookie year. His career fielding percentage of .953, while respectable, reflects his defensive inconsistency. As a result, Brooks was moved around the diamond, which further suggests that his defense never fully matched the high expectations set for him.
In summary, Brooks met the offensive projections with a steady career at the plate, but defensively, his fielding ability fell short of the initial scouting optimism.
The Rise of Mike Scott: How a Splitter Turned a Control Pitcher into a Cy Young Winner
Scouting Report: "Good control-type pitcher;Rarely gives up Home runs;About ready to make it with the parent club."
Mike Scott’s early career with the New York Mets reflected his scouting report as a control pitcher, but he didn’t stand out as an ace. His lack of an effective off-speed pitch left him vulnerable, and his initial major league stats reflected mediocrity. His ERA with the Mets hovered around 4.64, and his record of 14-27 indicated he struggled to live up to his prospect potential.
However, his career trajectory took a dramatic turn when he learned the split-finger fastball in 1985, transforming him from a middling pitcher to a dominant ace for the Houston Astros. Over the next five years (1985-1989), Scott compiled 86 wins with a stellar 2.93 ERA, struck out 1,038 batters, and became one of the most feared pitchers in baseball. His control remained sharp, but his newfound ability to deceive batters made him a game-changer.
He peaked in 1986, winning the National League Cy Young Award after leading the league in ERA (2.22) and strikeouts (306). Despite ongoing allegations of ball scuffing, Scott maintained his dominance, particularly in the postseason, where he earned MVP honors in the 1986 NLCS despite his team losing the series. His ability to induce swings-and-misses by keeping hitters guessing between his fastball and splitter made him one of the most effective pitchers of his era.
The scouting report pegged Scott as a control pitcher with solid fundamentals, but it didn’t account for the revolution that came with learning the split-finger fastball. While his control remained a strength, his evolution into a dominant pitcher wasn’t foreseen by early scouting evaluations. In fact, his transformation came after several years of struggle and could not have been predicted based on his initial scouting. The splitter changed everything for Scott, allowing him to ascend to heights far beyond the report’s expectations, including becoming a Cy Young Award winner and a postseason legend.
This evolution showcases how much a single adjustment, like learning a new pitch, can completely reshape a player's career, turning a middle-of-the-pack prospect into one of the game's most feared aces.
Ed Lynch: A Case Study in Scouting Report Accuracy and Major League Performance
Scouting Report: "Showed ready for majors late in 1980; pitched well in 5 starts for the Mets, Good control, finesse pitcher."
The scouting report from March 1981 described Ed Lynch as a pitcher with "good control" and a "finesse" approach, which is validated by detailed analytics of his major league career. Lynch’s ability to control the game was reflected in his career metrics, including a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 1.73, which indicates his proficiency in managing his pitches effectively. His walk rate of 2.19 per nine innings was notably lower than the league average during his career, underscoring the accuracy of the scouting report’s emphasis on his control.
In terms of his finesse approach, Lynch’s career ERA of 4.12 and WHIP of 1.35 highlight his reliance on precision rather than overpowering hitters. His ERA+ of 101, which adjusts for the ballpark and league average, confirms that Lynch’s performance was slightly above league average but consistent with a pitcher who used command and pitch selection to navigate through games. Additionally, Lynch’s low strikeout rate, with only 396 strikeouts in 940⅓ innings, supports the report’s characterization of him as a pitcher who depended more on control and less on dominating stuff.
Further supporting the scouting report’s assessment, Lynch’s .284 batting average against and his ability to induce ground balls with a ground-ball rate of approximately 47% suggest that he successfully employed his finesse approach to limit hard contact. This is consistent with the profile of a pitcher who relies on placement and pitch movement rather than velocity. Thus, the scouting report’s portrayal of Lynch as a finesse pitcher with strong control was an accurate reflection of his actual performance metrics throughout his career.
In our examination of the Mets prospects from 1981 as highlighted by Baseball Digest, we've seen how their careers unfolded in light of the expectations set forth. For Hubie Brooks, the scouting report's assessment of his power potential was validated through his solid offensive output, while his defensive play fell short of the optimistic projections. Mike Scott's transformation from a control pitcher to a Cy Young Award winner demonstrates how a key adjustment—in his case, the adoption of the split-finger fastball—can dramatically alter a player's career trajectory beyond initial expectations.
Ed Lynch, whose scouting report highlighted his good control and finesse approach, offers a compelling case study in the accuracy of scouting predictions. His career metrics, including a strong strikeout-to-walk ratio and consistent ERA, reflect the report's portrayal of him as a pitcher who relied more on precision than overpowering stuff. The analytics confirm that Lynch’s performance was in line with the expectations set by the 1981 scouting evaluation, showcasing how effective a pitcher can be with control and finesse rather than raw power.
Overall, the journeys of Brooks, Scott, and Lynch reveal the complexities of evaluating prospects. While scouting reports offer valuable insights, they often cannot predict the full spectrum of a player's development and career changes. The evolution of these players underscores the dynamic nature of baseball, where both expectations and outcomes are shaped by an intricate blend of talent, opportunity, and sometimes unexpected changes.
4o mini
Good stuff. Read these Baseball Digest predictions in 1981 while hoping against hope they might be right. They were, though Scott—and arguably Hubie—were better after they were traded.